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The Bomb Thief and the Theory of
Justification Defenses*
Paul H. Robinson**

s a justification defense, such as self-defense, law enforcement
authority, or lesser evil, given because of an actor's good motive--his
justificatory purpose--for doing what otherwise would be an offense?
Or, is a justification defense given because, given the special justifying
circumstances, the law tolerates and even encourages the actor's conduct?
The answer to these questions has implications for how justification
defenses are formulated. The bomb thief case nicely illustrates the
tension between these two ways of characterizing the justification defense,
and helps illustrate why one theory is better than the other.

I

I. THE BOMB THIF.I~

Motti Ashkenazi, a thin, almost gaunt-looking man from a poor, crimeridden South Tel Aviv neighborhood, is strolling along a crowded
Jerusalem beach between Tel Aviv and Jaffa on a hot Friday afternoon

© Paul H. Robinson1998. This artide will be publishedin Hebrew by the
Td AvivUniversityFacultyof Law in I.rune/M/shpa~Vol. 22, No. 1 (Mar. 1998).
Professor of Law, NorthwesternUniversitySchool of Law, Chicago,Illinois,
United States; B.S., RensselaerPolytechnicInstitute 1970;J.D., Universityof California
at Los Angeles 1973; LL.M., Harvard University 1975; Dip. Leg. Stud., Cambridge
University1976.
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in June 1997. A drug addict and petty thief who only a week ago had
been arrested after bungling a car burglary, Ashkenazi has been thinking
for a while about getting off drugs and putting his life together. But the
going has been tough even with the support of his family.
As he walks, he sees that someone has left a black backpack
unattended in an open area by the sidewalk. The 30-year-old Ashkenazi
looks around but sees no one watching. He picks up the backpack and
quickly sneaks off, pleased by his good fortune. Without opening the
backpack to inspect his loot, he walks down nearby Geula Street to a
rundown apartment building and slips inside. There in the stairwell, he
unzips the backpack. Inside he sees a clock with wires connected to a
cookie tin, with loose nails surrounding the contraption. Ashkenazi
quickly realizes he just stole a bomb.
Panicked but in control, he runs into the nearby Savoy Hotel
and rushes up to the reception desk. He tells the clerk what he found
and the clerk calls the Tel Aviv police. The bomb squad arrives in
minutes and starts trying to deactivate the bomb in the apartment
building stairwell. Meanwhile, Ashkenazi stands outside the building,
keeping the street clear of passersby and warning a group of children to
stay away. The bomb squad finds that the bomb is packed with nearly
3 kilograms of explosives. They successfully neutralize it. Police officers
search the beach for more bombs but find none.
At first, Ashkenazi lies to the police and tells them he found the
backpack in the apartment building stairwell, where he had gone to
urinate, but later confesses to having stolen the backpack. Considering
the amount of explosives and the number of people in the area where the
bomb was left, police estimate that the bomb would have killed many
people in a major terrorist attack, t

This factual account is based on Raine Marcus, Petty ThiqC's "GoodDeed" Saves
Lives on Crowded TelAviv Beach, Jerusalem Post, June 22, 1997; Arutz Sheva, Stealing
a B&rt; June 22, 1997 (Judean Voice News and Commentary computer bulletin board
posting); Dod Lebia, First Time in My Life That I Went to the Police without Handcuj~,
Ma'ariv, June 23, 1997; Buki Na'eh & Efin Navon, SomeumesCn'me Can Pay Off[,
Ma'ariv, June 23, 1997; Erin Navon, RevealsBomb, Starts Rehab, Ma'ariv, June 23, 1997;
Chana Kaytm, The Luck of Motti Ashkenazi, Ha'Arets, June 23, 1997; Reuvan Shapira,
Addict Took a Bag on the Tel Aviv Beach, Found a Bomb Inside, and Alerted the Police,
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What criminal Liability should Ashkenazi have for the theft of the
backpack, if any? Ashkenazi's conduct constitutes theft; he has taken
another's property without the owner's permission. All jurisdictions and
scholars agree that, if he had known at the time of the offense what he
discovered later--that the bag contained a terrorist bomb--he dearly
would have been justified in taking the bag. Indeed, his knowing of the
actual circumstances would have made his conduct not just justified but
heroic. Of what effect is the fact that he did not know that his taking
the bag was justified, that he in fact thought he was committing theft?
Should he be liable for theft, which he thought he was committing? Or,
should he be exempt from liability became his act, while it normally
would have caused a net harm, in this instance caused a net benefit,
probably saving many lives?
These questions flame an ongoing dispute in criminal law theory
over the nature of justification defenses. Is a justification defense given
because the actor's deed in fact avoids a greater harm, the deeds theory of
justification, or because of the actor's reason for acting, his justificatory
purpose, the reasons theory?
In most cases of justification, both theories are satisfied: the
justifying circumstances exist; the actor knows of them and performs the
offense conduct because of them. She performs the right deed for the
right reason. But in two kinds of cases, the two theories conflict:
mistake as to a justification and an unknowingly justified actor.
Where an actor mistakenly believes she is justified, the reasons
theory would give a justification defense--for it is only the actor's
subjective intent that matters--while the deeds theory would deny a
justification defense. But this conflict between the theories ends
primarily in a labeling dispute. The actor denied a justification defense
under the deeds theory nonetheless will be exculpated trader an excuse
defense for her mistake as to a justification, assuming the mistake is
reasonable.
The reverse case, where an actor mistakenly believes that she is
not justified, act~3ally gives different liability results under the two
theories. An unknowingly justified actor has no defense under the

Ha'Arets,June 22, 1997; InterviewbyJon Van Samekwith Raine Marcus,JerusalemPost
reporter (July 22, 1997).
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reasons theory, with its subjective focus, for she believed her conduct was
unjustified. Under the deeds theory, in contrast, her conduct will be
justified, because the deeds theory looks to the objective nature of the
conduct. The unknowingly justified actor would be liable at most for
trying to act unjustifiably--what I will argue later is a standard form of
impossible attempt. Thus, while the reasons theory imposes liability for
the full substantive offense, the deeds theory imposes only the reduced
liability of attempt.
It is for this reason that the case of Motfi Ashkenazi, the bomb
thief--perhaps the cleanest case available of the unknowingly justified
actor--is so interesting and so important. In an earlier article, I argued
in support of the deeds theory. 2 This brief essay tests the theory and its
implications in the real world.

II. CURRENT LAW GOVERNING
T H E UNKNOWINGLY JUSTIFIF.D ACTOR

Most, but not all, American state criminal codes appear to follow the
reasons theory, although the apparent clarity of first appearances does not
always survive dose inspection. 3 The American Law Institute's Model
Penal Code uses a reasons formulation in its justification defenses: an
actor is justified "if she believes that her conduct is necessary for defense. 4
Current English law also appears to adopt the reasons theory. Smith and
Hogan, for example, conclude that English law "is stated exclusively in

2
In this essay I attempt only to summarize the central arguments made there.
For a full discussion,see Paul H. Robinson, Competing Theories offiatification: Deeds vs.
Reasom, in Harm and Culpability 45 (A. Simester & A.T.H. Smith eds., 1996).
3
At least one Americanjurisdictionformulates all of its justificationdefenses in
a purely objective form. N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-05-01 et seq. For a list of jurisdictions that have at least one objective justification statute, see 2 Paul H. Robinson,
Cr/m/na/Law DqCenses~ 122 n.19 (1984).
4
E.g:, Model Penal Code §§ 3.02(1), 3.03(3)(a), 3.04(1), 3.05(1)(b), 3.06(1),
3.o7(1).
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terms of the defendant's belief, ''5 citing the cases of Gladstone Williams,
Dadson, and Thain. 6 O n the other hand, section 24 o f the Police and
Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, appears to be an exception to the general
rule, for it justifies an arrest even if the officer did not at the time know
of or believe in the justifying circumstances, 7 reflecting a deeds theory of
justification. Clauses 44 and 185 of the proposed Criminal Code for
England and Wales appear to broaden this exception to make it the
general rule. That is, they would have the law adopt a deeds theory as
its general approach. T h e Draft Code provides a justification defense if
the actor "uses such force as, in the circumstances which exist," is
immediately necessary and reasonable for defense, s Interestingly, the
drafters claim that the provision codifies the c o m m o n law o f self-defense
and defense of another. 9 T h e y concede that it modifies the c o m m o n law
of defense of property, but argue that such is necessary to avoid an
irrational inconsistency between the rules for the defense of property and
person. 1° Israeli law appears to adopt the deeds theory. Sections 34J
and 34K of the Israeli Penal Law, self-defense and necessity, respectively,

s

J.C Smith & Brian Hogan, Cr/m/na/Law 245 (6th ed. 1988).

6
G/adstone W////arm, [1984] 78 Cr. App. R. 276; Dadsor~ [1850] 4 Cox C.C.
358; Tha/n, [1985] 11 NI 31.
7
Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, § 24(4)(a), (5)(a), (7)(a) (providing
that an actor may arrest without a warrant "anyone who is guilty of the offence" or words
to that effect).
8
A Criminal Codefbr England and Wales, Report and Draft Criminal Code Bill
61, 100 (1989) [hereinafter Draft Code]. The Draft Code also provides a defense if the
actor "uses such force as, in the circumstances . . . which he believes to exist," is
immediately necessaryand reasonablefor defense. This does not make the provision one
based upon a reasons theory of justification. Nothing in the deeds theory prohibits a defense for mistake as to a justification. On the contrary, it assumes that such a defense
will be provided but will be understood to be an excuse. Note that this provision of the
Draft Code does not identify either defense as a justification or an excuse.
9
The drafters explain: "[I]fhis de.fenceis that he was defending his person, or
that of another, the test at common law is whether what he did was reasonable." A
Criminal Codej~r Englandand Wales, Comnm~taryon Draft Criminal Code Bill § 12.25,
at 231 (1989) (emphasis added).
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are both formulated in purely objective terms, thereby giving a defense
to the unknowingly justified actor. II
Most academic writers have signed on in support of the reasons
t h e o r y and in opposition to the deeds theory, I2 s o m e suggesting that the
latter is "absurd, ''I3 unfair, 14 or unduly burdensome3 5

HI. DISAGREEMENTS OVER THE PROPER LIABII.ITY
FOR THE UNKNOWINGLY JUSTIF~.D ACTOR

Recall the differing results from the two theories. The reasons theory
gives no justification defense because the actor does not believe that the

u
Israeli Penal Law (573711977) (A.G. Feb. 1996). Some writers dispute this
interpretation.
12
E.g:, Michael Corrado, Notes on the Structure of a Theory of Excuses, 82 J. Crim.
L. & Criminology 465, 489 (1991) (arguing that state of mind is a necessity and that
Robinson's externalist perception is impossible to accep0; Kent Greenawalt, The Perp/exing Borders ofJustification and Excuse, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 144 (1984) (recognizing that
most modem statutes require a subjective belief in justification and that Robinson's fully
objective approach is an exception); Wayne LaFave & Austin Scott, Jr., Substantive
Cr/m/na/Law 685 (1986) (claiming that in order to have the benefit of justification one
must act for that particular purpose); Smith & Hogan, supra note 5, at 37 (requiting
state of mind as well as state of fact for justification is certainly reasonable).
13
"It seems to me absurd to say that I mayjust/~ or excusemy conduct, however
callous it was in the circumstances known to me at the time, by showing that there
existed other circumstances which, had I but known of them, would have justified or
excused my conduct." Brian Hogan, TheDadson Principle, 1989 Crim. L. Rev. 679, 680

(emphasis in original).
Arnold Loewy, Culpa~'~y, Dangeroumess, and Harrm Balancing the Factors on
Which Our Criminal Law Is Predicated, 66 N.C. L Rev. 283, 289 (1988) (arguing that,

14

as a matter of fairness, the issue ought to be one solely of culpability rather than resul0.
15
"[A] purdy objectiveview of self-defense.., is a more difficult factual question
for the defendant to resolve than the question of her own subjective belief since
calculation of the harm threatened involves a number of variables [which] are beyond the
defendant's ability to perceive." Kevin McMunigal, Disclosureand Accuracy in the Guiky
Plea Process, 40 Hastings LJ. 957, 979 (1989) (emphasis in original).
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justifying circtmmtances exist. Whether the circumstances actually exist
or not is irrdevant. Thus, Ashkenazi's theft is not justified even though
it was necessary for the protection of other persons' lives. Ashkenazi's reason for acting was wrong; that his deed was in fact objectively justified
is irrelevant. Under the deeds theory, in contrast, the actual nature of the
deed is central: Ashkenazi would receive a justification defense even
though he did not realize at the time that his conduct was objectively
justified. As discussed more fully below, in Section III.C, however, he
nonetheless may be liable for an attempt, and thereby receive some,
albeit reduced, liability.

JL Disagreement over the Sign~ance of Result'rig Harm
It may be that this disagreement over the proper liability level for the
unknowingly justified actor is simply a manifestation of a larger dispute
going beyond the nature of justification defenses. The grading disagreement may be simply another battleground in the dispute over the
significance of resulting harm. Those who believe that the criminal law
ought to focus on conduct and culpable state of mind alone, and that
the fortuity of resulting harm ought not affect liability, will naturally
prefer the result of the reasons theory. Their view is that only the actor's
subjective state of mind should matter to liability. That the unknowingly justified actor believes that his conduct is unjustified is enough in itself
to impose full liability, they would argue, just as the person who thinks
he has bought illegal drugs or believes he has lit a fuse on dynamite
sticks ought to be fully liable even if it turns out that the powder is
talcum and the dynamite sticks are wooden. The Model Penal Code, for
one, seems to take this view when it adopts a rule that generally punishes
attempts to the same extent as the substantive offense. 16
If this is the reason for one's support of a reasons theory of
justification, then there is little more to be said on the liability issue.
Even if one were to adopt a deeds theory, which gives only attempt

16
Model Penal Code ~ 5.05(1). In reality, however, the code does not adopt a
view that rejects the significance of resulting harrrL See inj~a text accompanying notes
1%25; see also Paul H. Robinson, The Ro/e of Harm and Evil in Criminal Law: A Study
in Legislative Decefltion?, 5 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 299 (1994).
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liability, under such a pure subjectivist approach attempts would be
graded the same as the substantive offense, thereby erasing any difference
in the liability results between the theories. Thus, pure subjectivists (i.e.,
those believing resulting harm ought to be irrelevant to liability) can skip
to the next section. They will find there that the community disagrees
with their view of the significance of resulting harm, as well as with their
view that the unknowingly justified thief ought to be punished the same
as the unjustified thief. They also will be interested in Section V, which
points out the problem their theory presents in the context of rules
governing resistance to an unknowingly justified actor.
Further, as I have argued a t length elsewhere, there are other
important reasons beyond liability results for preferring the conceptual
scheme and terminology of the deeds theory, t7 Only the deeds concept-alization of justification allows the law dearly to identify, with the label
"justified," conduct that it condones and will tolerate by others in similar
situations in the future. The reasons conceptuali?ation, by including
under the same label both justified conduct and mistake as to a justification, frustrates this important ex ante function of law. Conduct performed under a mistaken belief it is justified is not conduct the law
wishes to signal as approved in similar circumstances in the future. In
fact, it wishes to signal the opposite, that such conduct is to be avoided
in the future. By combining both objectively justified conduct and mistaken justification under the same label, "justified," the law hides this
important distinction. Under the reasons approach, then, case adjudications in which the defendant is acquitted as "justified" obscure and confuse the public as to the rules of conduct rather than clarify and educate.
On these grounds, even the pure subjectivist may conclude that a deeds
theory of justification is preferable.
Whatever the logical appeal of the pure subjectivist view, it is a
view that exists (and will probably always exist) only in academia. The
empirical study reported in Section IV is one of many that confirm a
nearly universal view among lay persons that, in their intuitive notions
of justice, resulting harm does matter, ts I know of no jurisdiction that

,7

Robinson, supra note 2, at 6 1 - 6 7 .

m
See also Paul H. Robinson & Jolm M. Darley, Justice, Liability, and Blame:
Community Hews and the Criminal Law 1, 17 (1995).
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a ~ = l l y takes a pure subjectivist view, whatever code drafters may say
they prefer. All American jurisdictions, even many of those adopting the
Model Penal Code, reject that code's notion that attempts should be
punished the same as the substantive offense. Even the Model Penal
Code itself is ambivalent in its apparent commitment to a pure
subjectivist view. It creates an exception for attempts to commit a firstdegree felony, such as murder. Thus, attempted murder is graded less
than murder) 9 More important, if the code really believed in the pure
subjectivist view, it would drop all result elements from its offenses, as
irrelevant to liability. In fact, it commonly defines offenses as containing
a result element. 2° Further, the Model Penal Code drafters selected the
most demanding, traditional definition of causation, the necessary cause
("but for") test. 21 If the drafters truly were unabashed subjecfivists, they
would at the very least have adopted a weaker causation test, perhaps a
sufficient cause test (as was proposed during the American Law Institute
floor debate on the causation section). 22 If results ought to be irrelevant
but for some unpleasant reason must be maintained, would not the
drafters at least want to make it as easy as possible to satisfy those
irrelevant result requirements?
It may be that the Model Penal Code drafters grudgingly added
result elements to offense definitions and adopted the strong, necessary
cause test of causation, because they thought the public would demand
it of their criminal law. z3 But this only concedes that the pure sub-

,9

Model Penal Code § 5.05(1).

20
E.g:, /d §§ 210.1 (Criminal Homicide--"causes the death"), 211.1 (Assault--"causes bodily injury to another"), 220.2(1) (Causing Catastrophe--"person who
causes a catastrophe").
z,

/d ~ 2.03(1)(a).

22
American Law Institute, Floor Debate on Model Penal Code ~ 2.03(1)(a),
A.I-I. Proc. 77-79, 135-39 (1962) (proposing that the actor's conduct be only "a
substantial factor in producing the result").
z3
See, e.o~, Model Penal Code § 2.03 comment 257 (1985) ("when severe
sanctions are involved.., it cannot be expected that jurors will lightly return verdicts
leading to severe sentences in the absence of the resentment aroused by the infliction of
serious injuries").
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jectivist view of criminal law is one that cannot be sold to those who are
to be governed by that law.24 To insist on a pure subjectivist view would
be to undercut the criminal law's moral authority with the public, which
in turn would endanger the law's effectiveness.25
Israeli Penal Law section 27 grades attempts in a way that is
similar in some respects to that of the Model Penal Code. It allows
judges to impose the same penalty for an attempt as for the substantive
offense, which might be taken to suggest a pure subjectivist view. But
the section exempts attempts from any mandatory or minimum penalty
that would apply to the substantive offense. The true subjectivist would
provide no such exemption, of course, for the exemption concedes that
attempts are different from the substantive offense in an important way,
a way that suggests a liability discount is appropriate where the harm
does not come about. In practice, under section 27, a judge may
provide a substantial reduction in all attempt cases. The empirical
evidence presented in Section IV, below, suggests the community would
prefer such a reduction. Thus, if judges concur in the community view,
they will follow such a practice. The only effect of section 27, then, is
to take away the traditional provision that set the maximum penalty for
attempt at less than that for the substantive offense. Given how rarely
offenders are sentenced to the statutory maximum, section 27 may be of
little effect.26
Nor can one take the provision as a symbolic commitment to the
pure subjectivist view. For, if that were the drafters' intention, there
would be no reason for them to retain the result elements of offense
definitions. 27 If every substantive offense and attempt deserve the same

,4

See generally Robinson, supra note 16.

25

For a full discussionof this point, see Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley,

The UtiliO, of Desert; 91 Nw. U. L Rev. 453 (1997).

26
Perhaps its primarypurpose is to give the pure subjectivistacademicsa sense
that their view is not being ignored.
~7
Another reason to be skeptical of the idea that the Israeli Penal Law takes a
pure subjectivistview is found in the objectiveformulation of justification defenses, in
§§ 34J and 34K, noted above. The only effectof having art objectiveformulationis to
give a defenseto the unknowinglyjustified actor--that is, to take account of the fact
that he has caused no net harrm If resultingharm is irrdevant--the pure subjectivist
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punishment upon the same conduct and culpable state of mind, on what
ground does the law retain a result element in substantive offenses? At
best, one can conclude that the Israeli Penal Law leaves the issue of the
significance of resulting harm to sentencing judges.
Given this, as well as the Model Penal Code's ambivalence on
the same issue, it is worth considering the implications for the unknowingly justified actor of a world where it is conceded that resulting harm
does matter to liability.
B. The UnknounMglyJusti~d Actor in a Worm Where Resulting
Harm Matters

If we assume, as the world we know does, that resulting harm ought to
increase liability, what theory of justification is preferable? If~people
generally think that resulting harm should matter to liability, why do so
many writers and code drafters seem to prefer the reasons theory of
justification? If state code drafters routinely reject the manifestations of
the pure subjectivist view, as in rejecting the Model Penal Code call for
grading attempts the same as the complete offense, why would they not
also reject the code's subjective formulation of justification defenses? Is
this simply the product of an untidy world, where the minority
subjectivist view is adopted in the formulation of justification defenses
simply because the state code drafters do not see the connection between
the issues of subjectivist attempt grading and subjectivist justification
formulations? In short, probably yes.
If a jurisdiction admits the significance of resulting harm in
assessing liability, if resulting harm may give rise to greater liability than
no resulting harm, it seems difficult to see how a jurisdiction can reject
the deeds theory of justification, which gives attempt liability to the
unknowingly justified actor, in favor of the reasons theory, which ignores

view--why would the Penal Law adopt the objective formulation? Indeed, one may
wonder about the internal inconsistency of a code that adopts an objective formulation
of justification defenses, then makes specific statutory provision to allow judges to grade
an attempt the same as the substantive offense. As a matter of general principle, resulting
harm is either relevant to the amount of punishment or it is not. Under what theory
could the unknowingly justified actor be entided to a dlscount--the effect of the
objective justification formulation--but the attempter not?
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the fact that the conduct in reality causes no net harm. The actor may
have thought he or she was causing a net societal harm but be surprised
to find that no such net harm occurs, tf the unknowingly justified actor
is to be held liable, the liability is analogous to that of the attempter who
thinks he is committing an offense, only to be surprised to find out that
he is not.

C. Unknowing Just~ation as a Legally Impossible Attempt
The propriety of viewing the unknowingly justified actor as an instance
of impossible attempt is confirmed by the fact that such an actor dearly
comes within the language of modern attempt provisions. He dearly
would be liable for attempt under sections 25 and 26 of the Israeli Penal
Law. Similarly, Model Penal Code section 5.01(1)(a) provides: "A
person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind
of culpability otherwise required for commission of the crime, he
purposely engages in conduct which would constitute the crime if the
attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be . . . . ,,2s Under
the circumstances as Ashkenazi believed them to be, he is liable for theft.
The harm that normally flows from a theft is outweighed in this instance
by the benefit derived because of the justifying circumstances. To hold
Ashkenazi liable for theft, as the reasons theory would do, is to ignore
this central fact. The existence of resulting net harm does matter.
Nonetheless, Ashkenazi has the culpable state of mind required for theft
and has shown his willingness to act upon it. These are the central
characteristics of and rationale for punishing an impossible attempter,
and Ashkenazi accordingly deserves to be held liable for attempt.
To deny the status of the unknowingly justified actor as an
impossible attempter, and the strength of the conceptual analogy between
the two, creates a challenge for reasons theorists. They must argue that
the fortuitous lack of harm that undercuts an offense element--the
shooter misses because the intended shooting victim bends down just as
the trigger is squeezed--ought to reduce the offense grade to that of an
attempt, but that the fortuitous lack of a net harm in a justification
case--Ashkenazi's theft saves lives--ought not reduce the grade to that

28

Model PenalCode ~ 5.01(1)(a).
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of an attempt. O n what grounds could such a distinction--between the
absence of a harm and the absence of a net h a r m - - b e defended?
George Fletcher argues that there is an important difference
between violating an offense norm and violating a justification norm; this
is the theme of his response to my paper on the subject of twenty years
ago. 29 I concede that the two certainly are different. Fletcher's arguments in this respect are persuasive, but then few would disagree with
the claim that offenses are concepomily distinct from justification
defenses. 3° What Fletcher must show is why the difference between
offense rules and justification rules are different in a way that drives us
to deviate from our general rule that the presence of resulting harm
ought to increase liability over that of an unsuccessful attempt to cause
it. I find nothing in his analysis that addresses this central point.
To put the offense-justification distinction in a factual context,
consider the following two cases. The actor believes a wind storm is
coming but ignores the risk and burns a field's harvest stubble (a common practice by farmers as a low-cost way to increase the fertility of the
ground) despite the likelihood that the wind storm will cause the fire he
sets to spread to a nearby town. It turns out that the actor is wrong
about the wind storm. There never existed any danger to the nearby
town, at least no more than the usual no wind storm stubble burning
creates. Is the actor guilty of reckless endangerment because he mistakenly believed that he was creating an unlawfifl danger? I think most
would say no--reckless endangerment requires proof of a real, not just
an imagined unreasonable, risk of harm. 31 At most, the actor could be
liable for attempted reckless endangerment, provided such an offense were

,-9
George P. Fletcher, The Right Deedfor the WrongReason:A Reply to Mr. Robinsort 23 U.C.LA. L Rev. 293, 308-18 (1975).
so
There are some important exceptions to this, however, at least among English
writers. See, e.g., GlanvilleWilliams, Textbookof Criminal Law 138 (2d ed. 1983).
3~
Model Penal Code § 211.2, Reckless Endangerment, provides in part:. "A
person commits a misdemeanorif he recklesslyengagesin conduct which places or may
place another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury." Thus if an actor does
not fully extinguish a campfire, which in turn causes a forest fire to ignite and places a
nearby town in imminent danger, the actor will be found guilty of recklessendangerment.
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recognized. 32
Now assume the same actor malidously bums his neighbor's
cornfield, but the burning serves as a firebreak to an oncoming forest fire
about which he did not know. The burning ends up saving the nearby
town and is, therefore, justified on the objective facts; in other words, a
standard unknowingly justified actor case. I would argue, by analogy to
the case above, that the actor ought not be held liable for the full
offensewthat is, he ought to get a justification defense--because no net
harm occurred. He could be held liable for an attempt, unjustifiably to
burn the field (there is no justifying good that comes from his
externalized intention unjustifiably to bum the field). If the absence of
real danger means the stubble-burner can be punished only for his
externalized culpable intention (as an attempt), how, in the absence of
any net harm, can the cornfield-burner who saved the town be punished
for more than h/s externaliTed culpable intention (as an attempt)?
Note that Professor Fletcher's claim that the issue should be resolved differently in the justification context than in the offense definition context runs into some practical difficulty in modern codes. The
Model Penal Code defines recklessness (and negligence) in a way that
incorporates the concept ofjustiflcation: it is criminal to disregard a risk
(or, in the case of negligence, to be unaware of a risk of which a reasonable person would be aware) that is "substantial and unjustzanea."
.,, -,,33 Thus,
the application of statutes requiring recklessness or negligence requires an
assessment of the justification of the risk, making it impossible toisolate
justifications for special treatment apart from offense definitions.
IV. F_aMPIRICAL DATA O N COMMUNITY VIEWS
OF THE UNKNOWINGLY JUSTIFIED A C T O R
Those opposed to a deeds theory of justification often offer intuitive
notions of justice in support of their position, while those in support do

32

I have argued elsewhere that it should be. Paul H. Robinson, A Funct/ona/

Analysis of CriminalLaw, 88 Nw. U. L Rev. 857, 88%96 (1994).
33

Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(c)-(d).
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the same, but suggesting a different intuitive notion of justice.~4 Such
claims, and disagreements, are common in criminal law theory and until
recently often marked a dead-end in the debate. But social science has
developed research techniques that can reliably resolve such disputes, that
can determine the community view on any of a variety of such questions,
as well as measure the extent of community agreement or disagreement.
A study was recently completed that tested, among other things, the
specific claim in dispute here: the community view of liability for the
unknowingly justified actor.
In this space it would be impossible to recount the details of
such research methods or to document their reliability. For a full
discussion, the reader is referred to the studies themselves.35 Generally,
the method used to probe subjects' moral intuitions is the "scenario" or
"vignette method." Subjects are presented with a short description of a
person's conduct and are asked whether and, if so, how much liability
and punishment the actor should receive for the conduct. Subjects next
are given another scenario, and assess liability and punishment for that
actor, then another scenario, and so on. The scenarios are varied by the
researchers in ways suggested by the theories being tested, and the
patterning of liabilities assigned each scenario provides differential
support for the competing theories.
In this study, subjects were given scenarios that included the
situations described in the first column of the table below. The second
column gives the mean of the subjects' liability judgments from a 13point scale: a "no liability" option and twelve liability choices, 0 through
11, each with an increasing amount of punishment. Specifically, the
subjects were given the following penalty scale: N (no liability) --~ 0
(liability but no punishment) --> 1 (1 day) --> 2 (2 weeks) --> 3 (2 months)
--> 4 (6 months) --> 5 (1 year) --~ 6 (3 years) --> 7 (7 years) --->8 (15 years)
--> 9 (30 years) --> 10 (life) -~ 11 (death).

E$, GeorgeP. Fletcher,RethinkingCrinu'na/Law555-56 (1978); 2 Robinson,
supra note 3, at 24.
3s
The specificfindingsreported here appear in Paul H. Robinson& John M.
Darley, Testing Competing Theories of fusnfication (submitted for publication; draft
availablefrom the author). The researchmethod is discussedat lengthin Robinson&
Darley, supranote 18, app. A.
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The last column of the table translates the liability mean into the
corresponding term of imprisonment. The study involved a variety of
related issues. I focus here on just those scenarios that speak to the
unknowingly justified actor dispute.

Liability Means
SCENARIO

LIABIHTY MEAN

IMPRISONMENT
EQUIVAr.FNT

4.65

- 10 months

3.52

- 4 months

0.57

essentially no
punishment

3.63

- 4 months

2.10

- 2 weeks

Control Cases
1. intentional
(unjustified)
burning
2. attempted (unjustified) burning
6. intentional
justified burning

Test Cases
7. unknowingly
justified burning
8. knowingly
justified burning
with bad motive

Scenario 1, a control case of an intentional burning with no
claim of justification, has a liability mean of 4.65 (equivalent to about
10 months' imprisonment). 36 This is what one might expect given the

The translationsfrom liabilitymeansto imprisonmentterms axe taken from the
table in Robinson & Darley, supranote 18, at 283.
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nature of the offense, a property offense in which no risk m persons is
created.
Scenario 2, another control case, is an unsuccessful attempt to
cause the harm actually caused in scenario 1. The liability assigned by
the subjects is 3.52 (just over 4 months). This is consistent with other
published research, which found substantially reduced punishment based
solely on the fortuitous absence of the intended harm. Indeed, the ratio
of penalties between scenarios 1 and 2 is consistent with those jurisdictions that set the grade of an attempt as one grade less than, or at half
the penalty of, the substantive offense.37 (On the exponential penalty
scale used in the study, one unit is equivalent to one offense grade in a
typical modem American criminal code, and each higher grade typically
doubles the penalty of the previous grade.)
Scenario 6, another control case, is an intentional justified
burning. As expected, it received essentially no punishment. Its liability
mean was 0.57. Among the subjects 38.5 percent gave no liability. Another 40.4 percent gave liability but no punishment. The remaining
21.2 percent gave punishment ranging from 1 day to 1 year. This
baseline is not as low as one might have guessed but still reflects the predicted judgment that the vast majority of subjects see the case as one of
little or no blameworthiness, despite the fact that an intentional harm is
caused.
Turning to the test scenarios, scenario 7, presenting the unknowingly justified actor, confirms the predictions of the deeds theory.
The perpetrator in scenario 7 receives a liability mean of 3.63 (just over
4 months). This is not statistically different from the attempt control
case in scenario 2, as the deeds theory predicts. Such liability is
dramatically less than the 4.65 liability (about 10 months) for the
substantive offense that the reasons theory predicts. The deeds theory
is dearly more consistent with community views on this matter.
(Scenario 8 presents the case of the actor who knows of the justifying circumstances but who acts for other, nonjustificatory motives.
Recall that current law would give a complete defense in such a
case--the actor "believes" in the justifying circumstances but is not

37
See the statuteslistedin Paul H. Robinson,Fundamenta/sof CriminalLaw297
(2d eck 1995).
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motivated by them--although logic would seem to suggest that a strict
reasons theory would give no defense. The liability mean is 2.10 (2.6
weeks), not the complete defense that current law would provide--only
7.8 percent of our subjects assigned a verdict of no liability--and not
the filll liability that the reasons theory logically would seem to suggest.
It is consistent, however, with the deeds theory prediction of liability of
somewhat less than that of the unknowingly justified actor. The actor
is entitled to at least the discount given the unknowingly justified actor
because his act is objectively justified; a greater harm in fact is avoided.
Unlike the unknowingly justified actor, however, this actor's liability for
attempt is less dear. His knowledge of the justifying circumstances may
suggest to him that his conduct is not in fact criminal; thus he has not
the clear intention to violate the law that the unknowingly justified actor
has. He might be viewed less as breaking the law than as taking
advantage of it. In any case, the results again are consistent with the
deeds view and inconsistent with the reasons view.)

V. LIABIHTY FOR RESISTING AN
UNKNOWINGLY J U ~ D
ACTOR

Beyond the issue of liability for the unknowingly justified actor, the
competing theories of justification have implications for the lawfulness
of resisting the unknowingly justified actor. Assume the terrorist in the
Ashkenazi case is watching his planted backpack from a distance, waiting
to see the bomb go off and the resulting mayhem. He sees Ashkenazi
steal the bag and confronts him, demanding its return. Can the terrorist
or an accomplice lawfully use force against Ashkenazi to regain control
of the bag? In other words, should one be able lawfiflly to resist a
person who one knows is an unknowingly justified actor?
Under the deeds theory, Ashkenazi's conduct is justified, and
therefore the terrorist cannot lawfully resist it. But the reasons theory
makes the actual justified nature of the deed irrelevant. Because he acts
for the wrong reason, the unknowingly justified actor is not justified.
He is acting "unlawfully," which traditionally creates a right lawfully to
resist the conduct. Yet logic tells us here again that reasons theory gives
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improper results. 3s Whether the deed is or is not act3,=lly justified ought
to be central to whether the law authorizes resistance to it. 39
An analysis of the statutory provisions confirms these results: the
reasons-based Model Penal Code would give the terrorist a right forcibly
to resist Ashkenazi's taking; the deeds-based Draft Criminal Code of
England and Wales would not.
Because Ashkenazi does not have the "belief" required for a
justification, his theft, even though it is necessary to save the people on
the beach, is not "justified" under the Model Penal Code. 4° Under the
code, an actor can interfere with conduct that is "unlawful. ''41 (Israeli
Penal Law section 34J has a similar requirement that defensive conduct
is permitted only against "unlawful" attack.) Is Ashkenazi's unjustified
conduct "unlawful"? Model Penal Code section 3.11(1) defines
"unlawful force" as: " f o r c e . . . w h i c h . . , would constitute [an] offense
. . except for a defense . . . not amounting to a privilege to use the
force." Ashkenazi has no defense to his theft; he will in fact be held
fully liable for it under the Model Penal Code. Thus, his theft is
"unlawful" and, therefore, the terrorist lawfully can resist his taking
under the code, even though he (the terrorist) knows of the justifying
facts! In other words, even the contorted definition of "unlawful force"
in section 3.11(1) does not save the Model Penal Code from improper
results. In the context of the unknowingly justified actor, the code's
reasons formulation of justification has a real and a detrimental effect.
While its effect is likely inadvertent--it is hard to believe that the
•

~s
The reasons advocatemight argue that the terrorist is not justified in interfering
because he does not have the proper justificatorypurpose; he knowswhat Ashkenazidoes
not, that the bag contains a deadly bomb. But the doctrine they have created would
describe the terrorist's conduct and state of mind as resistingan "unjustified"theft, which
surely a person is authorized to do. Immediately followingin the text is an analysis of
the reasons theory statutory formulations that shows just this conclusion. Once the
reasons advocate strips the unknowingly justified actor of the protection of being
"justified," it becomesdifficult in resurrectingthat privilegeto avoid resistanceby others.
39
If the resister were unaware of the justifying circumstances,of course she may
be entided to an excusefor mistaken justification.
~0

Model Penal Code § 3.02.

4,

Id § 3.06.
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drafters actually intended such a result--it demonstrates the dangers of
constructing a code using the reasons approach.
Note that the Draft Criminal Code for England and Wales
avoids this error by providing an objective form of justification.
Whether the terrorist lawfully may interfere with Ashkenazi's theft under
the proposed code depends upon whether Ashkenazi's theft is "unlawful,"
as defined by section 44(3). Ashkenazi would have a defense to his theft
under section 44(1)(c); 42 the circumstances exist that make his theft
necessary to protect others even though he does not know of those
circumstances. But his defense will not be one of those enumerated in
section 44(3), situations in which, despite resulting in an acquittal, the
conduct nonetheless is held to be "unlawful." Ashkenazi's defense is not
that he thought his theft was necessary, as would be relevant under
section 44(1)(c), for example, but rather that his theft was in fact
necessary. Therefore, his conduct is not "unlawful" under section 44(3)
and, therefore, the terrorist cannot lawfully resist i t - - t h e proper result. 43

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The deeds and reasons theories give different results for both an
unknowingly justified actor and a person resisting such an actor. The
reasons theory gives no defense to an unknowingly justified actor; thus
full liability. The deeds theory gives a justification defense, but the
unknowingly justified actor nonetheless is liable for an impossible

42
"A persondoes not commitan offenseby usingsuch force as, in the circumstanceswhichexistor whichhe believesto exist, is immediatelynecessaryand reasonable
•.. (c) to protect himselfor anotherfrom unlawfiAforce or unlawfulpersonalharm..
• ." Draft Code, supra note 8, § 44(1)(c).
43
Ashkenazi
may be liablefor an impossibleattempt under ~ ~§ 49-50, and his
conduct might be considered"unlawful"for the purposes of/d § 44 on this ground,
which would give the wrong result of allowingthe terrorist lawfullyto intervene. But
this difficultywith the Draft Code could be fixedwith minor changesby makingdear
that the right to use forcedependsupon the "unlawfulness"of the actual conduct, not
the conductmistakenlyenvisionedin the mind of the person beingdefendedagainst.
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attempt in most modern code jurisdictions. The deeds approach, then,
generates the proper result, a conclusion confirmed by the empirical
study showing that lay persons see the unknowingly justified actor as
liable at the reduced attempt level, not at the level of fifll substantive
liability that the reasons theory would provide.
The two theories also give different liability results for a person
who resists an unknowingly justified actor. The reasons theory, having
concluded that the unknowingly justified actor's conduct is unjustified,
allows a person lawfully to resist the justified conduct. This is the result
tinder the Model Penal Code, but surely it is the wrong result (and may
not have been intended by the drafters) for it allows a person lawfully to
engage in conduct that the person knows to be against society's interest.
The deeds theory, in contrast, properly denies a defense to one who
resists one he knows to be an unknowingly justified actor. 44
These liability results, together with the labeling advantages of
the deeds theory in distinguishing objective justification from subjective,
mistaken justification, 45 suggest that justification theory and law ought

44
Russell Christopher challenges the deeds theory by offering this hypothetical:
assume two unknowingly justified actors, each of whom is about to attack the other for
malicious reasons, unaware that their attacks are in fact objectively justified. Both acts
would seem to be justified under the deeds theory, Christopher argues, which is not
possible. My analysis would be to find that each actor is justified (to the extent that his
conduct is in fact necessaryfbr defense, which may require an impossible manipulation of
the facts--but assume such would be possible). Does this conclusion create a problem
for the deeds theory? I think not. It is normally true that for two actors in combat only
one is justified; either one's conduct or the other's creates a net harm, not both. But the
point of this hypothetical is to superimpose two justification situations on top of one
another. But this does not alter our assessment of each of the attacks and the response
to it. Both initial attacks are unjustified; both defenses to the attacks are justified; both
actors are liable for attempt for their unknowingly justified use of force. In each instance,
the deeds theory wants to announce that such conduct (the unknowingly justified
defensive conduct) is justified under such circumstances (because of the original
unjustified attack) for similar actors in similar situations in the future. (One might even
argue that both actors are liable for assault based upon their original unjustified attacks.
If the attacks start simultaneously, at their origin both are aggressive, rather than
defensive, and therefore not justified. This analysis, however, would not support liability
for any resulting injury, because the later conduct causing injury would have occurred
after the unjustified attack began and therefore would be unknowingly justified.)
~5

See supra text accompanying and

follo~ngnote

17.
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to follow a deeds theory rather than the reasons theory currendy more
popular.46
What is the implication of the reasons-deeds dispute for Motti
Ashkenazi? Because of the lives saved by his actions, the police decide
not to charge Ashkenazi in the theft, and allow him an easy plea bargain
in another case pending against him. Ashkenazi becomes a bit of a hero
in Tel Aviv.
On the other hand, there is criticism of the police and prosecutors for letting him off easy. He becomes a bit of a comic hero. He is
lampooned on a late-night talk show for his "good deed." The talk show

Some writers, such as Fletcher, have urged a dual requirement: that the actor
both perform the right deed and act for the right reason. I find such a dual requirement
pu~ling. I understand the theory behind the reasons approach: a justification defense
ought to depend upon whether the actor thought he was justified; many theorists believe
that an actor's externalized culpable state of mind ought to be the sole criterion for
criminal liability. I also understand, and support, the theory behind the deeds approach:
that the defense ought to depend upon the absence of a net resulting harm; no net harm
renders the unknowingly justified actor an impossible attempter, who, like any at-tempter,
deserves less liability than one who actually brings about the harm or evil of the
substantive offense. I do not, however, understand the theory behind this dual requirement approach. It seems internally inconsistent in its view on the significance of resulting harm and on the sufficiency of culpability as grounds for full liability. How would
one articulate the general theory of liability behind requiting both the fight reason and
the right deed? Is the absence of a net harm significant or not? Is externalized culpability suffident for full substantive liability or not? Apparendy, the answer to these
questions is different in different s i t u a t i o n s - mistakenly justified and unknowingly
justified - - but k is not apparent why the answers to such questions should depend on
the factual situation.
Even if one could articulate a theory for the dual requirement, it would not
necessarily answer the many objections to the reasons theory, for it too denies a defense
to and thereby imposes full liability on the unknowingly jusffied actor. To review, a
reasons theory denies the significance of the analogy between the unknowingly justified
actor and the impossible attempter. That is, by denying a defense to the unknowingly
justified actor, it treats him as indistinguishable from the actor with a similar culpable
state of mind who is not objectively justified. The dual requirement approach would do
the same. Further, the reasons theory, by denying a justification to the unknowingly
justified actor, authorizes others lawfully to resist that objectivelyjustified conduct. Thus,
because the unknowingly justified actor is treated as unjustified, even one who knows of
the jusfififing circumstances can lawfully resist him. The dual requirement approach
suffers the same defect.
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host envisions a drugged out Ashkenazi invited to meet the president and
reimbursed for the income he lost when the backpack did not contain
valuables. The conflicting feelings about the Ashkenazi case are understandable.
Under a deeds theory, Ashkenazi's conduct is recognized as
beneficial, and it is given a legal status reflecting that benefit: it is
justified, and therefore beyond lawful interference by others. Much of
the expressed public admiration for what Ashkenazi did bespeaks this
feeling.
But the deeds theory also draws an important distinction
between Ashkenazi's conduct, which is admirable, and his motivation,
which is reprehensible. The deeds theory would privilege the conduct
against interference but would impose liability and punishment on
Ashkenazi for his demonstrated willingness to commit what he thought
was an unjustified theft. While the terrorist could not lawfully interfere
with him, Ashkenazi himself would be liable for attempted theft.
While public admiration for Ashkenazi's deed can easily spill over
to admiration for the man, it ought to be resisted. There is societal
value in publicly admiring the conduct, for it signals to all that such
conduct would be encouraged in the future, even would be thought of
as heroic. But there is also societal value in making clear that Ashkenazi
himself is to be condemned, for it is only in this way that the norm
against theft can be unambiguously reinforced.
By defining justifications subjectively, the reasons theory obscures
this key distinction: it allows the law to announce only whether an a c t o r
is "justified"; it allows the law no mechanism by which it can announce
the character of the act. The deeds theory, in contrast, highlights the
distinction between the act and the actor. Ashkenazi's act may be
praised, while Ashkenazi is condemned.
The reasons theory also misses the mark when it sees Ashkenazi
as no different from other thieves, and thus liable for full substantive
liability. Ashkenazi and other thieves a r e different, as different as are an
attempted murderer and a murderer. The latter has caused a net harm;
the former has only tried to. One may hope that, if exposed to the
deeds theory of justification--and its implication that Ashkenazi is properly treated as an attempter--reason theory supporters may find the
deeds view more appealing.

